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This research approaches the anomalous 
situations detection issue from a pattern 
recognition point of view, where a connectionist 
model is applied to identify user behavior 
patterns. The aim of this multidisciplinary 
research is the design of a system capable of 
detecting anomalous situations for a computer 
network. The connectionist architecture used here 
has never been applied to the Intrusion Detection 
(ID) and network security fields before this 
research. This work line demonstrates that 
connectionist models are capable of satisfying the 
requirements and dynamic features of the ID 
problem. By exploiting the strengths of neural 
networks in recognition, classification and 
generalization, this work illustrates the 
effectiveness of these techniques to the ID field. 
The presented Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is 
used as a method to investigate the traffic that 
travels along the analysed network, detecting 
SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) 
anomalous traffic patterns. It is also shown how 
the system is capable of detecting independent 
SNMP anomalous situations. It helps network 
administrators to decide if these anomalous 
situations are real intrusions or not. 
1. Introduction 
IDS are hardware or software systems that 
monitor the events occurring in a computer system 
or network, analysing them to identify computer 
security problems. They have become a necessary 
additional tool to the security infrastructure as the 
number of network attacks has increased very fast 
during the last years.  
Currently there are several techniques to 
implement IDS. Some of them are based on the 
use of expert systems (containing a set of rules 
that describe attacks), signature verification 
(where attack scenarios are converted into 
sequences of audit events), petri nets (where 
known attacks are presented with graphical petri 
nets) or state-transition diagrams (representing 
attacks with a set of goals and transitions). One of 
the main disadvantages of these techniques is the 
fact that new attack situations are not 
automatically discovered without updating the 
IDS.  
Connectionist models have been identified as 
a very promising technique of addressing the ID 
problem due to two main features: they are 
suitable to detect day-0 (previously unknown) 
attacks and they have the ability to classify 
patterns (attack classification, alert validation). Up 
to now, there have been several attemps to apply 
artificial neural architectures (such as Self-
Organising Maps [15, 22] or Elman Networks 
[14]) to the network security field [6, 7, 9]. This 
paper presents an IDS based on a neural 
architecture which has never been applied to the 
ID problem before. 
In the short-term, the Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP) can be defined as 
a protocol oriented to manage nodes in the 
Internet community [1]. This is, it is used to 
control routers, bridges, and other network 
elements, reading and writing a wide variety of in-
formation about the device: operating system, 
routing tables, default TTL (Time To Live), and 
so on. Some of this data can be extremely 
sensitive [18]. We have decided to study SNMP 
anomalous situations because an attack based on 
this protocol may severely compromise the 
systems security. CISCO [2] found the top five 
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most vulnerable services in order of importance, 
and SNMP was one of them. 
All the traffic travelling along the network has 
been taken into account to ensure the existence of 
both, anomalous and non-anomalous situations.  
2. The unsupervised pattern recognition 
model 
The Data Classification and Result Display 
steps (Figure 1) performed by this IDS model are 
based on the use of a neural EPP model called 
Cooperative Maximum Likelihood Hebbian 
Learning (CMLHL) [3, 4, 5]. 
Exploratory Projection Pursuit (EPP) [8, 10, 
13, 16] is a statistical method for solving the 
difficult problem of identifying structure in high 
dimensional data. It is based on the projection of 
the data onto a lower dimensional subspace in 
which we search for its structure by eye. It is 
necessary to define an “index” that measures the 
interestingness of a projection. After that, the data 
is transformed by maximizing the index in order 
to maximize the interest according to that index. 
From a statistical point of view the most 
interesting directions are those that are as non-
Gaussian as possible. 
Cooperative Maximum Likelihood Hebbian 
Learning (CMLHL) was initially applied to the 
field of Artificial Vision [4, 5] to identify local 
filters in space and time. Here, we have applied it 
to the computer security field [6, 7]. It is based on 
Maximum Likelihood Hebbian Learning (MLHL) 
[8, 13]. Consider an N-dimensional input vector, 
x , and an M-dimensional output vector, y , with 
ijW being the weight linking input ( j ) to output 
( i ) and let η  be the learning rate.  
 
CMLHL can be expressed as: 
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• Lateral activation passing:    
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• Weight change:   
( ) 1||.. −=∆ pjjiij eesignyW η  (4) 
 
Lateral connections [4, 5] have been derived from 
the Rectified Gaussian Distribution [21] and 
applied to MLHL. The resultant net can find the 
independent factors of a data set but do so in a 
way that captures some type of global ordering in 
the data set.  
3. Connectionist IDS model 
The information analysed by our system is 
obtained from the packets that travel along the 
network. So, it is a Network-Based IDS. The 
necessary data for the traffic analysis is contained 
on the captured packets headers and it can be 
obtained using a network analyser. 
The structure of this novel IDS model is 
shown in Figure 1 and it is described as follows: 
• 1st step.- Network Traffic Capture: one of the 
network interfaces is set up as “promiscuous” 
mode. It captures all the packets travelling 
along the network. 
• 2nd step.- Data Pre-processing: the captured 
data is pre-processed and introduced as the 
input data to the following stage.  
• 3rd step.- Data Classification: once the data 
has been pre-processed, the pattern 
recognition model (section 2) analyses the 
data and identifies anomalous patterns.  
• 4th step.- Result Display: the last step is related 
to the visualization stage. Finally the output is 
presented to the network administrator or the 
person in charge of the network security.  
 
180                                                                                          III Taller de Minería de Datos y Aprendizaje
4. Independent SNMP anomalous 
situations in real data sets 
The study of SNMP is the reason why the 
system selects packets based on UDP  (User 
Datagram Protocol) during the data pre-processing 
layer. We only select traffic based on UDP. This 
means that in terms of TCP/IP (Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) protocol stack, 
the model analyses only the packets that use UDP 
at transport layer and IP at network layer. 
We have focused our effort in the study of two 
of the most dangerous independent anomalous 
situations related to SNMP [6, 7]. These situations 
are MIB (Management Information Base) 
information transfer and SNMP port sweep. We 
have called these situations as independent ones 
because a “complete” attack should be formed by 
instances of them, making a compounded 
anomalous situation. 
4.1. MIB information transfer 
The IAB (Internet Activities Board) 
recommended that all IP and TCP implemen-
tations were network manageable [20]. The 
implementation of the Internet MIB and at least 
one of the management protocols like SNMP are 
the consequences of this suggestion.  
The MIB can be roughly defined as a database 
that contains information about some elements or 
devices that can be network-controlled. This is the 
database used by SNMP to store information 
about the elements that it controls. 
A MIB information transfer is a transfer of 
some information contained in the SNMP MIB. 
This is considered a quite dangerous situation 
because a person having some free tools, some 
basic SNMP knowledge and the community 
password (in SNMP v. 1 and SNMP v. 2) can 
come up with all sorts of interesting and 
sometimes useful information. 
4.2. SNMP port sweep 
This situation is a scanning of network 
computers for the SNMP port using sniffing 
methods. The aim is to make a systematic sweep 
in a group of hosts to verify if SNMP is active in 
one of the following ports: 161, 162 and 3750. 
The sweep has been done using these port 
numbers because: 
• 161 and 162 are the default port numbers for 
SNMP, as RFC 1157 [1] says: “protocol entity 
receives messages at UDP port 161, and 
messages which report traps should be 
received on UDP port 162”. 
• We have also included a random port (3750) 
in the sweep as a test random element. 
4.3. Characteristics of the data sets 
In this work, different data sets (containing 
examples of the anomalous situations described 
above) have been analysed by the IDS: 
Some features of the analysed traffic that 
travels along the network are the following: 
• In addition to the SNMP packets, the data sets 
contain traffic related to other protocols 






















Figure 1.   Structure of the Neural IDS Model 
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• The SNMP packets are generated and sent 
inside the own network, this is, it is an internal 
protocol and any host out of the network 
cannot introduce any packets of this type in 
the network. This is mainly warranted by the 
external security implemented through the 
firewall.  
 
In the Data Pre-processing step, the system 
performs a data selection of all the information 
captured. So all the data sets contain the following 
5 variables extracted from the packet headers: 
• Timestamp: the time when the packet was sent 
(difference in relation to the first captured 
packet).  
• Protocol: all the protocols contained in the 
data set have been codified. 
• Source Port: the port number of the source 
host that sent the packet. 
• Destination Port: the port number of the 
destination host where the packet is sent. 
• Size: total packet size (in Bytes).  
5. Experimental results 
The following figures (Figure 2 and Figure 3) 
show the best results obtained by the developed 
IDS, in order to analyse the data sets described 
before.   
 
 
Figure 2.    Best projection displayed by the model for 
the SNMP-port-sweep data set. 
Through a simple visual analysis of Figure 2, 
it can be seen that while most of the traffic 
evolves in the same direction, it is easy to identify 
three groups (Groups 1, 2 and 3.- Figure 2) 
progressing in a different direction. Each one of 
these groups contains packets sent to each port 
included in the sweep (161, 162 and 3750), which 
is embedded in the data set introduced to the 
model. These graphical features allow the 
identification of the sweep anomalous situation 
just by looking. 
 
 
Figure 3.    Best projection displayed by the model for 
the MIB-information-transfer data set. 
In Figure 3 it is easy to identify several packet 
groups. Two of them (Groups 1 and 2.- Figure 3) 
are different than other groups (related to normal 
traffic). These groups are related to the SNMP 
transfer mentioned above: they contain packets 
sent and received during the transfer embedded in 
the data set. Group 1 (Figure 3) contains all the 
traffic in one way (from destination to source), 
while Group 2 (Figure 3) contains all the traffic in 
the other way (from source to destination). These 
groups have been labeled as anomalous ones due 
to two combined issues: high temporal 
concentration of packets, and because they are 
made up of different size packets, situation which 
is related to the MIB information transfer. 
As can be seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3, the 
developed IDS is capable of identifying and 
highlighting both anomalous situations. It shows 
how the system works successfully in the cases 
where there is an anomalous situation among 
normal ones. In Figure 2 we have identified the 
sweep (Groups 1, 2 and 3) by means of 
normal/abnormal growth direction (in terms or 
parallelism) and in Figure 3 we have identified the 
MIB transfer (Groups 1 and 2) by means of high 
temporal concentration of packets. 
All the packets belonging to SNMP are 
contained in one of these “special” groups and 
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Figure 4.    PCA projection for the MIB-information-
transfer data set. 
We have applied different connectionist 
methods such as Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) [12, 19] to the same data sets. As it is 
shown before, CMLHL is capable of identifying 
both anomalous situations while PCA is just 
identifying the sweep, not detecting the MIB 




Figure 5.    Best MLHL projection for the MIB-
information-transfer data set. 
We have also applied a more complex than 
PCA connectionist method: Maximum Likelihood 
Hebbian Learning. In this case, the differences 
with CMLHL are not as clear as in the case of 
PCA. MLHL is capable of detecting both 
anomalous situations, but not as clearly as CMLH 
do, as can be seen for the MIB information 
transfer data set in Figure 5. In this figure, It can 
be seen how MLHL detect the MIB information 
transfer (Groups 1 and 2 .- Figure 5) , but in a less 
clear way than CMLHL (Figure 3). We can 
resume that CMLHL provides more sparse 
projections [4].  
6. Conclusions and future work 
This research demonstrates the effectiveness 
and robustness of this novel IDS due to its 
capability to identify independent anomalous 
situations, showing its capacity for generalization.  
In terms of performance results, we can say 
this model works because it has identified and 
distinguished both the MIB transfer and the port 
sweep situations (anomalous situations that we 
know in advance as we have chosen the toy data 
set).  
The visualization tool used in the Result 
Display step, shows data projections highlighting 
anomalous situations clearly enough to alert the 
network administrator, taking into account aspects 
as the traffic density or “abnormal” directions. 
Finally, only the person in charge of the network 
security has the authority to decide if the 
anomalous situations are real intrusions or not. 
Further work will be focused on the applica-
tion of GRID computation [11, 17] with more 
complex data sets, trying to extend the model to 
cover several different situations, including other 
protocols apart from SNMP. 
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